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ABBOTT v. ABBOTT: REVIVING GOOD FAITH AND
REJECTING AMBIGUITY IN TREATY JURISPRUDENCE
MOLLY K. MADDEN ∗
In Abbott v. Abbott, 1 the Supreme Court of the United States considered whether ne exeat rights 2 constitute rights of custody under the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 3 (“the Hague Convention”). 4 The Court held that ne exeat rights,
which require parental consent when another parent removes a child
abroad, are in fact rights of custody. Therefore, the non-removing
parent had a right to seek a return remedy—that is, the return of the
child to his habitual country of residence. 5 Abbott, as the postRehnquist Court’s first case dedicated to treaty interpretation, provides a glimpse into the Court’s evolving approach to treaty interpretation. As lower courts wrestle with increasing numbers of treaty cases, such a glimpse is invaluable.
Abbott reveals two significant points for treaty interpretation and
one missed opportunity. First, Abbott suggests that the post-Rehnquist
Court is reviving the canons of good faith and liberal interpretation,
Copyright © 2012 by Molly K. Madden.
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
Thank you to the excellent editorial staff of the 2010–11 and 2011–12 Maryland Law Review, particularly Kathleen Harne whose thoughtful and positive comments guided me
through my early efforts. Thank you also to Professor Michael Van Alstine, who graciously
provided insightful comments and direction when I faltered midway. Finally, thank you,
as always, to Dan Amon and his endless supply of tough love, patience, and unfaltering
support. Any errors are mine alone.
1. 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
2. Id. at 1987 (recognizing a ne exeat right in the family law context as “the authority
to consent before the other parent may take the child to another country”). See also Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 947 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002) (defining a ne exeat clause as a
“writ which forbids the person to whom it is addressed to leave the country, the state, or
the jurisdiction of the court” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1031 (6th ed. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
This term originates from the phrase “ne exeat regno,” which translates to “let him not go
out of the kingdom.” WEBSTER’S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 968 (1913).
3. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
4. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1987.
5. Id. at 1997.
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treaty-interpretation doctrines that had been ignored for nearly seventy years. 6 Second, the Abbott decision rejects ambiguity as a trigger
for reference to extratextual sources as aids in interpretation. 7 Third,
the Abbott Court missed an opportunity to clarify the distinction between treaty and statutory interpretation and inform lower court ad8
judication of treaty cases.
I. THE CASE
On August 26, 2005, Jacquelyn Abbott removed her son, A.J.,
from their residence in Chile and took him to the United States without the knowledge or consent of A.J.’s father, Timothy Abbott. 9 The
Abbotts had separated in March 2003 after ten years of marriage. 10 At
the time of their separation, Mr. and Ms. Abbott lived in La Serena,
Chile. 11 A Chilean family court awarded to Ms. Abbott “daily care and
control” of A.J. and to Mr. Abbott “specific direct and regular visitation rights.” 12 On January 13, 2004, the Chilean court granted Ms.
Abbott’s request for a ne exeat order, which prohibited either parent
from removing A.J. from Chile without the other parent’s consent. 13
This order supplemented the ne exeat right already imposed by a Chilean family-law statute. 14 Ms. Abbott subsequently removed A.J. from
Chile without Mr. Abbott’s consent. 15
Mr. Abbott located A.J. in Texas with the help of a private investigator. 16 He then filed suit in U.S. federal court and requested that

6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. See infra Part IV.C.
9. Abbott v. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d 635, 637 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 542 F.3d 1081
(5th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
10. Id. Mr. Abbott is a British citizen, while Ms. Abbott is a U.S. citizen. Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1082 (5th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010). Their son, A.J., was
born in Hawaii in 1995. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
11. Id. The Abbotts began their residence in Serena, Chile, in 2002. Id.
12. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Chilean
court granted Mr. Abbott visitation rights in January 2004. Abbott, 542 F.3d at 1082. In a
November 2004 order, the court granted all custody rights to Ms. Abbott and denied Mr.
Abbott’s request for custody rights. Id. In February 2005, Mr. Abbott’s visitation rights
were expanded by court order to include visitation for a month during summer vacation.
Id.
13. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
14. See id. at 638 n.3 (recognizing “the statute does not confer rights distinguishable in
any significant way from those conferred by the Chilean court’s ne exeat order”).
15. Abbott, 542 F.3d at 1082. Ms. Abbott removed A.J. while motions were pending in
the Chilean family court. Id.
16. Id.
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A.J. be returned to Chile because his removal constituted a “wrongful
removal” under the Hague Convention, which governs international
child abduction. 17 The district court in Texas denied Mr. Abbott’s
request, finding that the Chilean court’s ne exeat order did not grant
Mr. Abbott custody rights. 18
This finding proved fatal to Mr. Abbott’s contention that A.J.’s
removal was “wrongful” under the Hague Convention. 19 The district
court emphasized that the Hague Convention establishes two kinds of
rights: custody rights and access rights. 20 Only custody rights, the
court held, may result in a “wrongful removal” under the Hague Convention and provide a remedy of a court-ordered return to the country of habitual residence. 21 The court also stated that the majority of
federal courts deciding similar cases had held that a ne exeat order
does not constitute a right of custody under the Hague Convention. 22
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that ne
exeat rights are not rights of custody. 23 The Fifth Circuit, like the district court, identified the dispositive question to be whether Mr. Abbott possessed “rights of custody” under the Hague Convention. 24 To
answer that question, the court examined the split in the circuits 25
and compared the Second Circuit’s decision that ne exeat rights are
not rights of custody under the Hague Convention with the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision that a “ne exeat right . . . is sufficient to constitute a
custody right.” 26 The Fifth Circuit also noted disagreement among

17. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 637–38.
18. Id. at 641. However, the court noted in its denial that it “in no way condones Ms.
Abbott’s action. She clearly violated a proper order of the Chilean court—an order she
herself sought.” Id. at 640–41.
19. Id. at 641.
20. Id. at 639.
21. Id. See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 8–20 (describing the procedures for a
return remedy only in those cases where a child’s removal is in breach of rights of custody); infra Part II.A.2 (discussing Hague Convention).
22. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 638–39.
23. Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1082 (5th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
24. Id. at 1083.
25. Id. at 1084 (“Three federal appellate courts have determined that ne exeat orders
and statutory ne exeat provisions do not create ‘rights of custody’ under the Hague Convention. One federal appellate court . . . reached the opposite conclusion.” (citations omitted)).
26. Id. at 1084–86 (describing Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), abrogated by
Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010), and Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702 (11th Cir.
2004)).
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foreign courts on whether ne exeat rights are custody rights. 27
The court emphasized that while the ne exeat order gave Mr. Abbott a “veto right over his son’s departure from Chile,” this “veto
right” did not constitute a right to determine where in Chile A.J.
should live. 28 In fact, reasoned the Fifth Circuit, the Chilean court
expressly denied Mr. Abbott any custody rights by granting all custody
rights to Ms. Abbott. 29 The court held that “ne exeat rights, even when
coupled with ‘rights of access,’ do not constitute ‘rights of custody’”
under the Hague Convention. 30 The Fifth Circuit denied Mr. Abbott’s return request on the grounds that he held no custody rights
and therefore no return right under the Hague Convention. 31 The
Supreme Court of the United States granted Mr. Abbott’s petition for
certiorari to resolve the circuit court split on whether a ne exeat right
constitutes a right of custody. 32
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Interpretation of treaties has a long history in American jurisprudence. 33 Court precedent instructs that treaty interpretation begins with its text. 34 In the case of international parental abductions,
the text to be consulted is that of the Hague Convention. Part II.A,
therefore, begins with a discussion of relevant family-law terminology,
the Hague Convention, and recent U.S. case law interpreting whether
ne exeat rights constitute custody rights. 35 Part II.B provides a brief
overview of relevant treaty interpretation philosophies—namely, the
27. Id. at 1086 (citing Furnes, 362 F.3d at 719) (noting that the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa, and Israel recognize ne exeat rights as rights of custody while Canada
and France do not).
28. Id. at 1087.
29. Id.
30. Id. The Fifth Circuit found the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Croll particularly persuasive. Id. (emphasizing that the treaty “clearly distinguishes between ‘rights of custody’
and ‘rights of access’ and that ordering the return of a child in the absence of ‘rights of
custody’ in an effort to serve the overarching purposes of the Hague Convention would be
an impermissible judicial amendment of the Convention”).
31. Id. at 1087–88. The Fifth Circuit noted, as the district court did, that Ms. Abbott
“unquestionably violated [Mr.] Abbott’s rights by removing their child from Chile without
his consent,” but could offer no remedy to Mr. Abbott under the Hague Convention as
Mr. Abbott lacked rights of custody. Id.
32. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1989 (2010).
33. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 201–09 (1796) (interpreting the 1783
Treaty of Peace between the United States and Great Britain).
34. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.”).
35. See infra Part II.A.
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canons of good faith and liberal interpretation. 36 Part II.B concludes
by discussing the mechanics of treaty interpretation in U.S. courts 37
and recent treaty decisions by the post-Rehnquist Supreme Court. 38
A. Understanding the Terminology and Context of the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
The Hague Convention governs international parental childabduction law and, therefore, whether a violation of a ne exeat right
constitutes a wrongful removal and grants a corresponding right of
return under the Convention. 39 Before delving into a discussion of
the Hague Convention, this section begins with an overview of relevant family-law terminology. This section then describes the Hague
Convention framework. The section concludes by discussing the split
in U.S. circuit courts over whether ne exeat rights constitute custody
rights under the Hague Convention.
1. Defining Rights of Custody and Access, as Well as Ne Exeat
Rights, in International Family Law
A custody right usually connotes a responsibility for daily supervision and care of a child. 40 In the family-law context, Black’s Law Dictionary defines custody as “care, control, and maintenance of a child
awarded by a court to a responsible adult.” 41 A custody right, however, may not always mean either sole physical custody of or decisionmaking responsibility for a child. 42 Parents may share custody rights.
Additionally, a parent without custody rights may have a role in decision making or periodic physical custody of the child. 43 Such rights
for the noncustodial parent constitute visitation rights or “rights of
access.” 44 These synonymous rights 45 generally provide a noncustodial parent with access to the child. 46

36. See infra Part II.B.1.
37. See infra Part II.B.2.
38. See infra Part II.B.3.
39. Hague Convention, supra note 3. The United States recognizes the Hague Convention as binding domestic law, as stated in the International Child Abduction Remedies
Act (“ICARA”), 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (2006) [hereinafter ICARA].
40. BARBARA STARK, INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 182 (2005).
41. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 441 (9th ed. 2009).
42. STARK, supra note 40, at 182.
43. Id.
44. Visitation or access rights are not to be confused with joint custody rights. Cf. id.
(“Visitation generally refers to briefer periods of time (during summer vacations, for example), while joint custody refers to a more equal balance of responsibility.”).
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The exact meaning of such legal terms, however, can vary depending on the national jurisdiction in question or the applicable legal instrument. For example, the Hague Convention provides explanations for both custody and access rights. 47 Although these
explanations are not exhaustive definitions of the terms, 48 any court
applying the Hague Convention must turn to them. 49 Custody rights,
the treaty states, “shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s
place of residence.” 50 Access rights under the Hague Convention
“shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a
place other than the child’s habitual residence.” 51
A court order or national statute may condition established
rights of custody or access. One type of condition is a ne exeat right. A
ne exeat right prevents a person from going beyond the jurisdictional
reach of a court unless certain conditions are met or the court grants
permission. 52 In the context of family law, a ne exeat right prevents a
parent from removing a child from a court’s jurisdiction. 53 A ne exeat
provision may be contained in either a court order or conveyed as a
statutory right. Chile, for example, establishes a ne exeat right through
45. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 41, at 14 (defining access, in the family
law context, as “visitation”). See also ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11602(7) (2006) (“[T]he term
‘rights of access’ means visitation rights.”).
46. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 41, at 1707 (defining visitation as “[a] relative’s, [especially] a noncustodial parent’s, period of access to a child”).
47. See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 5 (defining rights of custody and access).
48. ELISA PÉREZ-VERA, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE 1980 HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION
CONVENTION 451 (1982) [hereinafter PÉREZ-VERA REPORT] (emphasis added), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf (“The Convention, following a long-established
tradition of the Hague Conference, does not define the legal concepts used by it. However, in this article [5], it does make clear the sense in which the notions of custody and
access rights are used, since an incorrect interpretation of their meaning would risk compromising the Convention’s objects.”).
49. Cf. Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 145 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“While traditional American notions of custody rights are certainly relevant to our interpretation of the Convention, the construction of an international treaty also requires that
we look beyond parochial definitions to the broader meaning of the Convention, and assess the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of [the Convention’s] object and purpose.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31.1; May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331)),
abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
50. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 5(a).
51. Id. art. 5(b).
52. Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 947 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Abbott, 130
S. Ct. at 1983.
53. See Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1082 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008) (“‘Ne exeat’ is defined
in the family law context as ‘[a]n equitable writ restraining a person from leaving, or removing a child or property from, the jurisdiction.’”), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
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a statutory provision. 54 This provision requires the non-removing
parent’s consent prior to a child’s removal from Chile by the other
parent. 55 This consent is required regardless of whether the removing parent is the custodial parent or a parent with access rights. 56
2. The Hague Convention
Parental child abduction 57 is governed internationally by the Hague Convention. This multilateral agreement seeks to prevent and
remedy the wrongful taking abroad of children by parents or guardians. As a private-law treaty, the Hague Convention provides nonremoving parents with enforceable rights to either: (1) in the case of
access rights, gain recognition of those rights in a foreign court or,
(2) in the case of custody rights, have a child returned to her country
of habitual residence. 58 The United States recognizes the Hague
Convention as binding domestic law, as stated in the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”). 59 United States courts
therefore look directly to the treaty’s text when reviewing Hague
Convention cases. 60 U.S. circuit courts, however, differ in their interpretations of ne exeat rights under the Hague Convention. 61

54. See Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, 534 F.3d 142, 145 n.1 (2d Cir. 2008)
(providing an excerpt of the Chilean Minors Law describing the statutory ne exeat provision).
55. See Abbott, 542 F.3d at 1083–84 & n.4 (describing the Chilean Minors Law to require “that if a non-custodial parent has visitation rights, that parent’s authorization is required before the custodial parent can take the child out of the country”).
56. Id. at 1084 n.4.
57. PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 1 (1999) (distinguishing this “unilateral removal or
retention of children” from third-party or “classic kidnappings” by emphasizing that a parental abductor seeks to “exercise . . . sole care and control . . . in a new jurisdiction” rather than obtaining “material gain”). “Child abduction,” sometimes described as legal
kidnapping, is a term of art in international private law and is distinguishable from thirdparty, or non-parental, kidnapping. Id. at 1, 3.
58. See infra notes 66–73 and accompanying text.
59. ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (2006) (“The courts of the States and the United
States district courts shall have concurrent original jurisdiction of actions arising under
the Convention.”); id. § 11601(b)(2) (“The provisions of this chapter are in addition to
and not in lieu of the provisions of the Convention.”).
60. Id. § 11601(b)(4) (“The Convention and this Act empower courts in the United
States to determine only rights under the Convention and not the merits of any underlying child custody claims.”).
61. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
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a. The Hague Convention Is a Collaborative Framework to
Resolve the Problem of Child Abduction and a Mechanism to
Return Wrongfully Removed Children
The Hague Convention seeks to deter and remedy international
child abduction and to ensure access in the event of lawful removal.
Specifically, the Hague Convention’s objectives are to “secure the
prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any
Contracting State; and . . . to ensure that rights of custody and of
access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected
in the other Contracting States.” 62 The Hague Convention’s private
rights—that is, the individual right to prompt return and respect for
established custody and access rights—only apply among the Convention’s contracting or member states. 63
The Hague Convention provides a framework for foreign respect
and restoration of rights rather than re-adjudication of the merits. 64
This framework envisions “a system of close co-operation among
[member states’] judicial and administrative authorities.” 65 Courts
62. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 1. As described in the Convention’s preamble, respect for these private parental rights is premised on the “interests of children” and
the need “to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful
removal or retention.” Id. pmbl. The Hague Convention’s development coincided with a
changing familial dynamic worldwide. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 57, at 2 (describing child abduction as a “late twentieth century” issue resulting from increased personal mobility, international marriages and relationships, and subsequent divorces, as well
as a general “breakdown in traditional family structure”).
63. Currently, there are eighty-seven member states to the Hague Convention. Status
Table,
Hague
Convention,
HAGUE
CONF.
ON
PRIVATE
INT’L
LAW,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Nov. 15,
2011). These members include both the United States and Chile. Id. The United States
signed the Convention in 1981, and ratified it in 1988, the same year the Convention entered into force for the United States. Id. Chile acceded to the Hague Convention in
1994, and the treaty became law the same year. Id. The United States accepted Chile’s
accession in 1994 (as required by Article 38 of the Hague Convention). Id. In the event
an abduction occurs to or from a non-member state, public-law treaties may provide recourse for parents if the involved countries are members to those public-law treaties. The
most relevant public-law treaty is the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the
Child, which imposes a duty on states, as described above, to “take measures to combat the
illicit transfer and non-return of children abroad.” U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child art. 11, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989).
64. See, e.g., ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (2006) (“The Convention and this chapter empower courts in the United States to determine only rights under the Convention
and not the merits of any underlying child custody claims.”).
65. PÉREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 48, at 435. A survey determined that at least 1,610
Hague Convention applications were processed in 2003. HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L
LAW, A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF APPLICATIONS MADE IN 2003 UNDER THE HAGUE
CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION 7, 10–11 (2007),
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abd_
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hearing Hague Convention cases do not redistribute parental rights
previously established in another member state but instead consider
whether (1) a child’s removal was wrongful and therefore requires return of the child to her habitual country of residence, or (2) parental
rights have been violated through a child’s removal or retention
abroad. 66
A child’s removal is considered wrongful when the removal is in
violation of custody rights that “were actually exercised, either jointly
or alone, or would have been . . . but for the removal or retention.” 67
Custody rights are defined as rights “relating to the care of the person
of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place
of residence.” 68 Such custody rights may result “by operation of law
or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision.” 69
In contrast, removal by a custodial parent in violation of the nonremoving parent’s access rights does not constitute a wrongful removal under the Hague Convention; the treaty specifically limits wrongful
removal to a breach of custody rights. 70 The Hague Convention defines access rights as including “the right to take a child for a limited
period of time to a place other than the child’s habitual residence.” 71
The Convention seeks to protect these rights through member-state
cooperation and recognition of established access rights. 72 Prompt

pd03e1_2007.pdf (describing questionnaire responses from fifty-eight member states). Of
these 1,610 applications, approximately 1,355 were for return of a child and 255 were for
access to a child. Id. at 10–11. In contrast, at least 1,280 applications were processed in
1999, with approximately 1,060 return applications and 220 access applications. Id. at 7,
10–11 (note that only thirty-nine member states responded in the 1999 survey). The scope
of abductions and their resolutions is unknown. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note
57, at 1–2 (“The true extent of the phenomenon has been, and remains, a point of some
conjecture.”).
66. See PÉREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 48, at 429 (“[S]ince one factor characteristic of
the situations under consideration consists in the fact that the abductor claims that his action has been rendered lawful by the competent authorities of the State of refuge, one effective way of deterring him would be to deprive his actions of any practical or juridical
consequences. The Convention, in order to bring this about, places at the head of its objectives the restoration of the status quo, by means of ‘the prompt return of children
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State.’” (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 1(a))).
67. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(a), (b).
68. Id. art. 5(a).
69. Id. art. 3.
70. See id. (defining as “wrongful” the removal or retention of a child that occurs “in
breach of rights of custody” but not in breach of access rights).
71. Id. art. 5(b).
72. See id. art. 21 (describing procedures for securing “effective exercise” of access
rights, binding member states to “the obligations of co-operation . . . to promote the
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return of a child is not required by the treaty, however, when removal
or retention only violates access rights. 73
Custody and access rights are the only terms given some explanation in the Hague Convention. The explanatory report for the Hague
Convention, known as the Pérez-Vera Report, describes such an approach as consistent with treaties developed by the Hague Conference on Private International Law. 74 This same report suggests that
the definitions for custody and access rights are not exhaustive. 75 Ne
exeat rights, however, are not mentioned in the Hague Convention.
b. United States Circuit Courts Differ on Whether Ne Exeat
Rights Constitute Custody Rights Under the Hague
Convention
Over the last decade, five U.S. circuit courts examined, without
achieving unanimity, whether ne exeat rights constitute custody rights
under the Hague Convention. Four of the circuit courts concluded
that ne exeat rights do not constitute custody rights, 76 while the fifth
court determined that ne exeat rights are custody rights under the Hague Convention. 77 The Second Circuit’s Croll v. Croll decision is the
leading decision for courts holding that ne exeat rights are not custody
rights, while the Eleventh Circuit’s Furnes v. Reeves decision represents
the alternative view that ne exeat rights are custody rights.

peaceful enjoyment of access rights,” and requiring member states to remove “obstacles to
the exercise” of access rights).
73. See id. art. 3 (limiting wrongful removal, which requires prompt return of child, to
a breach of custody rights).
74. PÉREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 48, at 451 (“The Convention . . . does not define
the legal concepts used by it. However, in this article [5], it does make clear the sense in
which the notions of custody and access rights are used, since an incorrect interpretation
of their meaning would risk compromising the Convention’s objects.”).
75. Id. at 452 (stating that “[t]he Convention seeks to be more precise by emphasizing,” in the definition of custody rights, that the right to determine a child’s place of residence is “an example of . . . ‘care’” while the definition for access rights does not exclude
other methods of exercising access rights).
76. Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1082 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that ne exeat rights
are not rights of custody), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010); Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d
491, 500 (4th Cir. 2003) (same), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010);
Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2002) (same), abrogated by Abbott, 130 S.
Ct. at 1983; Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2000) (same), abrogated by Abbott,
130 S. Ct. at 1983.
77. Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 714 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a ne exeat right
provides a custody right).
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1. Croll v. Croll: Ne Exeat Rights Are Not Rights of
Custody Under the Hague Convention
Croll began with the separation and divorce of two U.S. citizens
living in Hong Kong. 78 A Hong Kong court issued a custody order
that included a ne exeat clause. 79 Ms. Croll violated this clause when
she took her daughter from Hong Kong to New York without Mr.
Croll’s consent. 80 The Second Circuit held that the ne exeat clause did
not grant Mr. Croll the custody right necessary under the Hague
Convention to require his daughter’s prompt return to Hong Kong. 81
The Croll court based this holding primarily on the treaty’s text
and the drafters’ intent. The court observed that “[n]othing in the
Hague Convention suggests that the drafters intended anything other
than [an] ordinary understanding of custody,” which in turn suggested to the circuit court that the ordinary United States’ understanding of traditional custody rights would apply. 82 The court emphasized that the travel restriction imposed by the ne exeat order was
insufficient to constitute a custody right in the non-custodial parent,
since a Hong Kong court awarded “custody care and control solely to
the mother.” 83 The Second Circuit examined the Hague Convention’s ratification history and found that the drafters’ intent was consistent with the court’s own determination that ne exeat rights are not
custody rights. 84 The Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits looked to Croll
for guidance and were persuaded similarly that a “single veto power”
coupled with access rights was insufficient to constitute a custody
right under the Hague Convention. 85
78. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 138-39 (relying on U.S. court cases and “American lexical sources”).
83. Id. at 139–40 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Then-Circuit
Judge Sotomayor dissented from this decision, noting in particular, “[i]nterpreting the
text of the Convention in light of its object and purpose, and taking into account the relevant case law in this area, I reach the opposite conclusion. In my view, the majority seriously misconceives the legal import of the ne exeat clause and, in so doing, undermines
the Convention’s goal of ‘ensur[ing] that rights of custody . . . under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.’” Id. at 144 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 4).
84. Id. at 141–42 (majority opinion) (examining materials from the drafting chair, the
official history, and the Department of State’s transmittal of the treaty to the U.S. President).
85. Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1087 (5th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010);
Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 500 (4th Cir. 2003), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130
S. Ct. 1983 (2010); Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Abbott,
130 S. Ct. at 1983.
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2. Furnes v. Reeves: Ne Exeat Rights Are Custody Rights
Under the Hague Convention
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the reasoning of the other
circuit courts and instead determined that ne exeat rights do constitute
custody rights under the Hague Convention. 86 In Furnes v. Reeves, the
Eleventh Circuit decided that the characterization of a ne exeat right as
“a mere veto right” was not fatal to finding a ne exeat right to be a custody right under the Hague Convention. 87 Under a settlement
agreement, the parents in Furnes shared a “joint parental responsibility,” where the American mother had physical custody of and the
Norwegian father had regular access to their daughter during vacations and holidays. 88 Additionally, under Norwegian law, joint parental responsibility includes the right to make decisions regarding some
aspects of a child’s care and specifically requires the consent of both
parents for a child to move abroad. 89 The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the latter right as constituting a ne exeat right for the Norwegian father, which the mother violated when she removed the daughter to the United States without the father’s permission. 90
After assessing the facts of the case, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the ne exeat right constituted a custody right under the
Hague Convention. To the circuit court, the father’s ability to determine whether his daughter lived outside of or within Norway was sufficient to qualify as a custody right under the Hague Convention. 91
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with Croll’s reasoning because, consistent with the Hague Convention’s definition of custody rights, a ne exeat right is not a mere limitation or veto right against foreign travel
but rather a parental right to determine a child’s place of residence
within or outside the relevant country. 92
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit also rejected Croll’s reasoning that ne
exeat rights contravene the purpose of the Hague Convention because

86. See Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 716, 719 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a ne exeat right provides a custody right and rejecting the Croll decision).
87. Id. at 716 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at 706–07.
89. Id. at 707–08.
90. Id. at 714.
91. Id. (explaining that “violation of a single custody right suffices to make removal of a
child wrongful,” and as long as the parent possesses at least one custody right, “a parent
need not have ‘custody’ of the child to be entitled to return of his child under the Convention”).
92. Id. at 719–20.
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they may result in return of a child to a non-custodial parent. The
purpose of the Hague Convention, the Eleventh Circuit observed, “is
to prevent the international abduction of children” and ne exeat rights
as custody rights are consistent with that purpose. 94 In contrast to
previous circuit court decisions, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately held
that the parental right to weigh in on a decision relating to a child’s
place of residence, even if in the form of a ne exeat right, was sufficiently related to the child’s care to qualify as a custody right under
the Hague Convention. 95
B. Treaty Interpretation in the United States
Treaty interpretation in the United States involves constitutional
considerations, philosophical differences, and use of basic interpretation tools. The Constitution grants treaties the force of federal law 96
and establishes the judicial branch as the primary authority to interpret treaties. 97 Once a treaty becomes U.S. law, 98 any private rights
conveyed by that treaty may be enforced through litigation. 99 Although the creation of a treaty and its entry into U.S. law is under the
authority of the political branches, courts interpret treaty language
and apply these interpretations to the relevant case or controversy. 100
93. Id. at 720–21.
94. Id. at 721.
95. Id. at 716.
96. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”); see
also Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (“Our constitution declares a treaty
to be the law of the land.”).
97. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”); see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 199, 239 (1796) (“[T]he courts, in which the cases arose, were the only proper
authority to decide, whether the case was within this article of the treaty, and the operation and effect of it.”).
98. Treaties can be either self-executing or non-self-executing, which affects how they
become U.S. law. A self-executing treaty automatically has the force of law when the treaty
enters into force, which means that the treaty itself becomes U.S. law. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (recognizing self-executing treaties as binding federal
law). A non-self-executing treaty requires that Congress pass a statute to implement the
terms of the treaty, which means that the statute is U.S. law rather than the treaty itself. See
id. at 505–06 (recognizing that non-self-executing treaties cannot “create[] binding federal
law in the absence of implementing legislation”).
99. Maiorano v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 213 U.S. 268, 272–73 (1909) (“A treaty . . . is the
supreme law of the land, binding alike National and state courts, and is capable of enforcement, and must be enforced by them in the litigation of private rights.”).
100. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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Despite designating the judicial branch as the final authority on
treaty interpretation, the Constitution provides no set approach to
that interpretation. 101 Various philosophies of interpretation have
guided U.S. treaty jurisprudence throughout the country’s history. 102
However, certain guiding principles of interpretation—that is, certain
basic mechanics or tools—remain consistent. 103 This section begins
by describing, in Part II.B.1, the canons of good faith and liberal interpretation, which were the dominant treaty interpretation philosophy until the mid-twentieth century. Part II.B.2 discusses the mechanics of treaty interpretation. Part II.B.3 gives an overview of the postRehnquist Court’s first three treaty-interpretation cases.
1. A Purposive Approach to Treaties: The Canons of Good Faith and
Liberal Interpretation
There is no single philosophy guiding U.S. treaty interpretation:
U.S. Supreme Court cases instead reference a number of different
philosophies. 104 One of these philosophies is the philosophy of good
faith and liberal interpretation, which influenced treaty interpretation throughout the nineteenth century and dominated treaty jurisprudence in the first half of the twentieth century 105 before seemingly dying out in the latter half of the twentieth century.
The canons of good faith and liberal interpretation provide a
“prudential norm” to guard against judicial treaty breaches. 106 Under
101. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV.
953, 957 (1994) [hereinafter Bederman, Revivalist Canons] (emphasizing that “no rules of
treaty interpretation . . . are mandated by the Constitution itself, or are legitimately derived directly from constitutional allocations of authority”).
102. See infra Part II.B.1.
103. See infra Part II.B.2.
104. Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty We Are Expounding,
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1247 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court lacks a coherent doctrine for
interpreting treaties.”). Examples of treaty interpretation approaches include emphasizing executive deference. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 718–19 (2006)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“But where, as here, an ambiguous treaty provision . . . is susceptible of two plausible, and reasonable, interpretations, our precedents require us to defer
to the Executive’s interpretation.”).
105. See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294 (1933) (noting that liberal construction of treaty obligations and good-faith considerations are principles “consistently
recognized and applied by this Court”); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 540
(1884) (“Treaties of every kind . . . are to receive a fair and liberal interpretation, according to the intention of the contracting parties, and are to be kept in the most scrupulous
good faith.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
106. Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for
Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1932 (2005) [hereinafter Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith]
(“If a court construes the domestic-law incidents of a treaty in a manner consistent with its
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the liberal-interpretation canon, courts favor an interpretation of a
treaty that is more, rather than less, protective of the rights laid out by
the treaty. 107 Similarly, the good-faith doctrine recognizes that the
unique nature of treaties requires courts to consider obligations to
treaty partners and to interpret internationally-agreed-upon text as
distinct from domestic legal understandings. 108 Liberal interpretations undertaken in good faith were intended to limit judicial breaches of international obligations. 109
The canons of good faith and liberal interpretation focus on
three key elements. First, these canons emphasize that interpretation
should consider the “objects and purposes” of the treaty’s member
states. 110 Second, good faith and liberal interpretation recognize that
reciprocity and equal obligation exist among member states. 111
Third, these interpretative canons reject strict adherence to the text
at the expense of breaches in international obligations.112 By recoginternational law obligations, no violation occurs. But . . . if the interpretation misfires, it
is the court’s action (not the international conduct of the executive branch) that breaches
the treaty.”).
107. See Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 249 (1830) (“If the treaty admits of two
interpretations, and one is limited, and the other is liberal; one which will further, and the
other exclude private rights; why should not the most liberal exposition be adopted?”).
Fifty years after Shanks, Hauenstein v. Lynham described Shanks as the “settled rule” when it
virtually reiterated this Shanks language on liberal interpretation. 100 U.S. 483, 487
(1879).
108. See In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 68 (1821) (“[The arguments]
embrace the interpretation of a treaty which we are bound to observe with the most scrupulous good faith, and which our Government could not violate without disgrace, and
which this Court could not disregard without betraying its duty. It need not be said, therefore, that we feel the responsibility of our stations on this occasion . . . .”). See also Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1888 (observing that this doctrine “served to
remind courts of the special international law origins of treaties, of their fundamental difference with purely domestic legal norms, and of the need to show sensitivity for the views
of our nation’s treaty partners”).
109. See Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902) (“As treaties are solemn engagements entered into between independent nations for the common advancement of
their interests and the interests of civilization, . . . they should be interpreted in that broad
and liberal spirit which is calculated to make for the existence of a perpetual amity . . . .”).
110. Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331–32 (1912) (recognizing that treaties “are to
be read in the light of the conditions and circumstances existing at the time they were entered into, with a view to effecting the objects and purposes” of the member states).
111. See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933) (“Considerations which
should govern the diplomatic relations between nations, and the good faith of treaties, as
well, require that their obligations should be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between.”).
112. See United States v. Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 220 (1902) (“[T]he court ought to hesitate to adopt any construction of the treaty that would tend to defeat the object each
[member] had in view.”). See also Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court,
1901–1945, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 191, 213 (David L. Sloss
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nizing that treaties “are to be read in the light of the conditions and
circumstances existing at the time they were entered into, with a view
to effecting the objects and purposes” of the member states, 113 the
Court embraced an interpretive philosophy that included consideration of international obligations and purpose, as well as treaty text
and drafter intent. 114
Reference to treaty objects and purposes often signaled the
Court’s use of good faith and liberal interpretation. For example, in
United States v. Yen Tai, the Court cautioned against “adopt[ing] any
construction of the treaty that would tend to defeat the object each
[member state] had in view.” 115 Similarly, Sullivan v. Kidd recognized
that treaties “are to be executed in the utmost good faith, with a view
to making effective the purposes of the high contracting parties.” 116
By 1931, the Court called liberal interpretation “the familiar rule”
that “is not necessary to invoke” when emphasizing that “regard
should be had to the purpose of [a t]reaty.” 117 This purposive approach was termed an “accepted canon” by the Court in the 1940 decision Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech. 118
Subsequent international law integrated aspects of good faith
and a purposive approach to treaty interpretation. Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that “[a] treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose.” 119 The Vienna Convention, while not ratified by the United States, 120 “represents generally accepted principles . . . the United States has also appeared willing to accept . . . de-

et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court] (observing that the
“practical consequence of . . . liberal interpretation . . . was a profoundly flexible approach
that was open to the broader purposes of a treaty and was not mindlessly bound to its
text”).
113. Rocca, 223 U.S. at 331–32.
114. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, supra note 112, at 213.
115. Yen Tai, 185 U.S. at 220.
116. 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921).
117. See Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 37, 40 (1931) (noting the proper construction of the treaty language).
118. 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940).
119. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
120. The Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT’L LAW,
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/vclt/vclt.html.
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spite differences of nuance and emphasis.” 121 At least one American
scholar has suggested that citations to Article 31 by U.S. courts suggest an implicit endorsement of the good-faith canon. 122
In the United States, however, the purposive approach fostered
by good faith and liberal interpretation vanished in the latter half of
the twentieth century. In the last seventy years, the Supreme Court
used the signal phrase “objects and purposes” only six times. None of
these references, however, signaled use of a purposive approach or a
return to good faith and liberal interpretation; more often, the references were simply quotes of an earlier case. 123 By the twenty-first century, U.S. scholars lamented the “death of good faith” and liberal interpretation. 124
2. Mechanics of Treaty Interpretation
Regardless of the philosophic approach applied, interpretation

121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325
cmt. a (1987) (discussing Articles 31(1) and (3) of the Vienna Convention on Treaties,
which are restated in § 325); see also Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 294, 299 (1988) (stating that the
text of the Vienna Convention was adopted by the United States). But see Paul R. Dubinsky, International Law in the Legal System of the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 470
n.58 (2010) (“American courts rarely make reference to the Vienna Convention’s rules on
treaty interpretation.”).
122. David Sloss, United States, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY
ENFORCEMENT 504, 518–19, 524 (David Sloss ed., 2009) (identifying nineteen cases referencing Article 31 out of 254 treaty-related cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court between 1970 and 2006, and categorizing these cases as using good faith).
123. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006) (“An international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in the context and in the light of its object and purpose.” (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325(1)
(1986)); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 169 (1993) (discussing the lower
court’s reading, as supported by the “object and purpose” of the treaty, and referencing
the drafters’ intent, as represented by the negotiating history), superseded by statute, Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-626 (1996); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 372–73 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 332 (1912)); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 711 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(quoting Rocca, 223 U.S. at 331–32); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466
U.S. 243, 262 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rocca, 223 U.S. at 331–32); Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 52 (1963) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that the
treaty’s “purposes and objectives” require a certain interpretation).
124. See Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1885, 1887 (observing that
“good faith has died” and that liberal interpretation “has suffered a similar, if less stark,
fate”).
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begins with a treaty’s text and its context. 125 The text represents the
“shared expectations” of the treaty’s member states 126 and therefore is
a reasonable basis for interpretation. 127 In reading the text, courts often apply tools from contract law 128 and general rules of construction. 129 Courts also may look beyond the text and consider extratextual sources, such as the negotiation and drafting history, the
postratification conduct of treaty member states, 130 the postratification interpretations by the courts of other member states, 131 and similar classes and types of treaties. 132
Reference to extratextual sources recognizes the unique nature
of treaties and is well-established in Supreme Court treaty jurisprudence. 133 The use of extratextual sources ensures a better understanding of U.S. legal obligations to other treaty member states and

125. See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699 (stating that treaty interpretation begins with the treaty’s text and “the context in which the written words are used” (quoting Société Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 534 (1987))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 650 (2004) (quoting Air France v. Saks,
470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Cf. In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 72 (1821) (“[T]this Court is
bound to give effect to the stipulations of the treaty in the manner and to the extent which
the parties have declared, and not otherwise.”).
128. See, e.g., Société Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 533 (“In interpreting an international treaty, we are mindful that it is in the nature of a contract between nations, to which
general rules of construction apply.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
But see E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991) (rejecting exact similarity between treaty and contract law by recognizing that “treaties are construed more liberally
than private agreements” (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 396) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
129. See, e.g., Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 700 (stating that “general rules of construction may be
brought to bear on difficult or ambiguous passages” in treaty interpretation).
130. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (“Because a treaty
ratified by the United States is not only the law of this land, but also an agreement among
sovereign powers, we have traditionally considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and drafting history (travaux préparatoires) and the postratification understanding of
the contracting parties.” (citation omitted)).
131. Husain, 540 U.S. at 658 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When we interpret a treaty, we accord the judgments of our sister signatories ‘considerable weight.’” (quoting Saks, 470 U.S.
at 404)).
132. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006) (using Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to define a phrase used in Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War).
133. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1943)
(“[T]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their
meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.”).
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prevents judicial breaches of treaty obligations. 134 Numerous rationales support the use of extratextual sources and explain why such
sources inform the U.S. legal obligation. For example, courts rely on
a treaty’s drafting history to better understand member-state intent at
the time the treaty was written. 135 Similarly, courts give “great weight”
to the executive branch’s interpretations of treaty provisions. 136 Foreign judicial decisions also help U.S. courts to understand how a treaty is subsequently interpreted by member states. 137 While not dispositive, these foreign decisions may provide guidance on how other
member states interpret the treaty, which in turn gives further context
for how the treaty should be interpreted by a U.S. court. 138
Despite the importance of extratextual sources to treaty interpretation, the last thirty years have seen a debate in the Supreme Court
about whether reference to extratextual sources is triggered only by
139
The reasoning advanced in cases such as Chan v.
ambiguous text.
Korean Air Lines, Ltd. 140 resembled both a textualist approach to statutory interpretation and the approach put forth by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 141 Specifically, Chan stated that inter134. Cf. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008) (“Because a treaty ratified by the
United States is ‘an agreement among sovereign powers,’ we have also considered as ‘aids
to its interpretation’ the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as ‘the postratification understanding’ of signatory nations.”).
135. Saks, 470 U.S. at 400 (“In interpreting a treaty it is proper, of course, to refer to the
records of its drafting and negotiation.”).
136. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961). The executive branch perspective
provides insight both into the member states’ intent at the time of drafting and, through
the executive branch’s postratification conduct, into the member states’ subsequent interpretation of the treaty. Cf. Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1943–44 (recognizing that respect for executive branch interpretations “is properly directed not at the
formal content of the law, but rather at the international implications of particular interpretive outcomes”).
137. Cf. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the Court “accord[s] the judgments of our sister signatories considerable
weight” and such respect is relevant as the foreign courts “adopted [the treaty] jointly”
with the United States (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
138. Id.
139. Compare Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (recognizing that “[t]he clear import of treaty language controls” the interpretation), with Chan
v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 136 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing for
consideration of the executive branch’s view, which “deserves at least to be stated in full,
and to be considered without the self-affixed blindfold that prevents the Court from examining anything beyond the treaty language itself”).
140. 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
141. Id. at 134. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that extratextual
sources are to be used only when the text is ambiguous or results in an unreasonable interpretation. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 119, art. 32 (recognizing reference to “supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work
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pretation begins and ends with the treaty’s text, unless that text is
ambiguous. 142
Justice Scalia elaborated on the reasoning for such an approach
in his concurrence to United States v. Stuart. 143 He emphasized that a
treaty’s members “carefully framed and solemnly ratified expression
of [their] intentions and expectations” in the treaty’s text. 144 Thus, in
Justice Scalia’s opinion, unambiguous treaty text expresses the parties’ intentions, and ambiguous text is the only “appropriate” reason
“to give authoritative effect to extratextual materials.” 145
Similarly, Justice Blackmun indicated in his dissenting opinion in
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. that reference to a particular extratextual source—specifically a treaty’s negotiating history—“is a disfavored alternative of last resort, appropriate only where the terms of
the document are obscure or lead to ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’ results.” 146
Yet the same cases, as well as other contemporaneous cases, offer
a divergent perspective. The Stuart majority, in fact, noted that extratextual sources “often assist us in giving effect to the intent of the
Treaty parties.” 147 Two months later in his Chan concurrence, Justice
Brennan cautioned against blind allegiance to the treaty’s text
alone. 148 The Court also recognized the importance of extratextual
sources in Air France v. Saks, in which the Court noted that “[i]n in-

of the treaty” only when a textual reading leaves the meaning “ambiguous or obscure” or
“leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable”). But see id. art. 31 (“A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
142. Chan, 490 U.S. at 134–35.
143. 489 U.S. 353, 371 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 373.
146. 509 U.S. 155, 194–95 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, supra note 119, art. 32), superseded by statute, Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009546, 3009-626 (1996). Similarly, United States v. Alvarez-Machain rejected consideration of
extratextual sources when the relevant treaty was silent on whether certain extradition
provisions applied. 504 U.S. 655, 664–66 (1992) (observing that, although pertinent language was drafted by legal scholars for possible use in the relevant treaty, there is no text
specifically addressing the respondent’s argument).
147. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 366 (citing Sumitomo Shoji Am. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185
(1982) (highlighting extratextual sources, “such as a treaty’s ratification history and its
subsequent operation”).
148. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 136 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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terpreting a treaty it is proper, of course, to refer to the records of its
drafting and negotiation.” 149
Other contemporaneous cases, such as Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 150 did little to clarify whether textual ambiguity is
necessary for reference to extratextual sources. Volkswagenwerk stated
that treaty interpretation begins with the treaty’s text and “the context
in which the written words are used,” but left unsaid what constitutes
“context.” 151 Adding confusion, the Court went on to say that
“[o]ther general rules of construction may be brought to bear on difficult or ambiguous passages” and subsequently referenced the relevant treaty’s drafting history. 152
Recent cases are similarly ambivalent about whether ambiguity is
a trigger for use of extratextual sources in treaty interpretation. In
Medellin v. Texas, the Court noted that treaty interpretation begins
with the treaty’s text. 153 The Court then stated that, because of a treaty’s unique nature, it considers extratextual sources to aid its interpretation. 154 Yet no mention was made of textual ambiguity as a trigger
for referencing these extratextual sources. When subsequently discussing the relevant treaty, however, the Court acknowledged that the
treaty’s text was silent on the question before it. 155 This acknowledgement could suggest the Court’s tacit acceptance of ambiguous text.
The Court’s failure to clearly state the need for ambiguity as a trigger
for reference to extratextual sources, however, left open the debate
over ambiguity.

149. 470 U.S. 392, 400 (1985).
150. 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
151. Id. at 699 (quoting Société Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 534 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
152. Id. at 700. This broad description is echoed by the Court in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
Floyd and with the same failure to clarify if such context may be provided by extratextual
sources. 499 U.S. 530, 534–35 (1991). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
describes “context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty” as including treaty
preambles and annexes, as well as “agreement[s] relating to the treaty . . . made between
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty.” Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, supra note 119, art. 31.
153. 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 396–97).
154. Id. at 507 (“Because a treaty ratified by the United States is an agreement among
sovereign powers, we have also considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiation and
drafting history of the treaty as well as the postratification understanding of signatory nations.” (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
155. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507–08. The treaty the Court discussed was the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 500 U.N.T.S. 241 [hereinafter Optional
Protocol].
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3. Treaty Interpretation in the Post-Rehnquist Court
The post-Rehnquist Supreme Court is in a period of transition
following the stable years of the Rehnquist Court. 156 At the same
time, the number of treaty cases in the lower courts is increasing. 157
In the initial post-Rehnquist years, the Court undertook three cases
that provide insight into the Court’s view of treaty interpretation.
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 158 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 159 and Medellin v. Texas, 160 though not exclusively treaty-interpretation cases, involved aspects of treaty interpretation relating to private-law treaties161 and
U.S. sovereign obligations to private parties. As a result, these cases
exited the realm of “purely” private-law treaty cases—meaning treaties
enforcing rights among private parties—to enter the realm of treaty
cases implicating sovereign obligations to private parties.
a. Sanchez-Llamas: Deference to the Executive in TreatyEnforcement Cases
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon 162 marked the post-Rehnquist Court’s
first foray into treaty law. The case involved U.S. authorities’ failure
to allow foreign nationals to notify their consulates upon detention. 163
Such a failure, the foreign national petitioners argued, violated “individually enforceable right[s]” 164 granted by Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations 165 and warranted suppression of

156. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 4
(2007) (observing that the final eleven years of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure
represented the longest period in U.S. history without changes to the Supreme Court
bench).
157. See Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 777, 781 (2008)
(recognizing the “dramatic proliferation of international treaties”).
158. 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
159. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
160. 552 U.S. at 491.
161. Private law is “[t]he body of law dealing with private persons and their property
and relationships.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 41, at 1316. In contrast, public
law is “[t]he body of law dealing with the relations between private individuals and the
government, and with the structure and operation of the government itself.” Id. at 1351.
162. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 331.
163. Id. at 331–32.
164. Id. at 342.
165. Art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. Article 36 provides that for
a foreign national detained by authorities, “if he so requests, the competent authorities of
the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to
custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.” Id. Additionally, Article 36
states that officials are to inform the detained foreign national of these rights. Id.
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any statements made while in detention. 166 Additionally, the petitioners argued that the United States is bound by decisions made by the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). 167
The Court, despite suggesting that the case was not a treaty interpretation case, 168 nevertheless indulged in some interpretation of
Article 36 and its application in the United States. For example, the
Court began by looking to the treaty’s text and noting that the treaty
leaves Article 36 implementation to each member state’s domestic
law. 169 The Court also pointed to the postratification conduct of
Vienna Convention member states, and found persuasive the lack of
acceptance for the exclusionary rule exhibited by the 139 other
member states. 170 Similarly persuasive for the Court was the fact that
no other country allowed for judicial remedies of Article 36 violations
through domestic courts. 171 Ultimately, however, because the Court
saw the case as an issue of treaty enforcement rather than interpretation, it held that whether the United States is bound by ICJ decisions
and interpretations is an issue for the executive branch. 172
Thus, Sanchez-Llamas suggested the doctrine of executive deference lives on, at least for private-law treaties implicating sovereign
obligations. Sanchez-Llamas focused on this doctrine to the exclusion
of a purposive approach—there was no concern expressed for the effect of the interpretation on international obligations or any attempt
to construe provisions for more liberal protection of individual rights.
b. Hamdan: Preferencing Drafter Intent, as Demonstrated in
Extratextual Sources, Over Executive Deference
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 173 encompassed a broad range of legal issues
involving the use of military commissions and the laws of war. Hamdan was a Yemeni national who was designated an al Qaeda operative
166. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 340.
167. Id. at 333–34.
168. Id. at 360. The Court, in fact, stated at the beginning of the opinion that it was
unnecessary to resolve whether the Vienna Convention grants individuals an enforceable
right, although the Court gave some consideration to this issue later in the opinion. Id. at
343–44, 347.
169. Id. at 343.
170. Id. at 343–44.
171. Id. at 347.
172. Id. Justice Breyer, in his dissent, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, argued that
the Court failed to “rise to the interpretive challenge,” which resulted in a de facto interpretation at odds with the Vienna Convention. Id. at 365, 398, 386 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer instead argued for an examination of the treaty’s text and intent. Id. at 379.
173. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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by U.S. officials and brought before a U.S. military commission.
The specific issues of treaty interpretation focused on how to interpret three clauses in Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention. 175
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority on the first two of the
three clauses under consideration, used a different approach for the
interpretation of each of the clauses. First, in rejecting the government’s argument that “conflict not of an international nature” did
not apply to an al Qaeda operative, 176 the Court looked to the treaty’s
official commentary and the treaty’s previous drafts. 177 The Court determined that the treaty applied to U.S. efforts against al Queda operatives on the basis of the commentary’s admonition that the Article 3
scope was to be “as wide as possible.” 178
Second, the Court interpreted the clause “regularly constituted
court” and determined that Hamdan’s commission deviated from that
179
Since neither the text nor the commentary to the Third
standard.
Geneva Convention defined a “regularly constituted court,” in reaching that conclusion the Court looked to a similar provision contained
in a related treaty, the Fourth Geneva Convention, and further described in the official commentary of that related treaty. 180
Third, Justice Stevens addressed the clause on “judicial guarantees,” but his interpretive approach to this clause did not gain the ma174. Id. at 566–68.
175. See id. at 630 (referencing Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
Third Geneva Convention]). The Convention’s three clauses under consideration were
“armed conflict not of an international character,” “a regularly constituted court,” and “all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” Id.
Treaty interpretation was one issue among many others, including discussion of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and separation of power concerns amidst questions of national security. See, e.g., id. at 590 (discussing the history of the military commission in the
United States).
176. Id. at 630. The government argued that efforts against al Qaeda were “international in scope” and therefore did not constitute a “conflict not of an international character”
that falls under Third Geneva Convention Article 3. Id. Additionally, the government argued that efforts against al Qaeda did not involve “High Contracting Parties,” as required
to be considered under the Convention’s Article 2. Id. at 628–30.
177. Id. at 630–31.
178. Id. Also persuasive for the Court was the fact that previous drafts of the treaty contained language limiting the scope of application of this article, and that such language
was subsequently removed. Id.
179. Id. at 632.
180. Id. The official commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention recognized “regularly constituted courts” as including ordinary military courts and excluding special tribunals. Id. The Court found further support in a related Red Cross treatise, which described such courts as established consistent with a country’s existing laws and procedures.
Id.
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jority of the Court. 181 Justice Stevens first noted that, similar to the
other two clauses, “[j]udicial guarantees” is not defined in the treaty’s
text. 182 Contrary to his approach with the other two clauses, however,
Justice Stevens did not look to any extratextual aids in interpretation.
Instead, he stated that the text must be read as incorporating the
“barest . . . trial protections” international law recognizes. 183
Hamdan demonstrated a variety of interpretive approaches, primarily grounded in the text and reference to extratextual sources.
Yet even the philosophy of executive deference was discussed in a dis184
senting opinion.
However, no reference was made to any type of
purposive approach or reliance on good faith and liberal interpretation.
c. Medellin: Consideration of Treaty Text, Drafting History,
and Postratification Conduct of Signatories
Medellin v. Texas, like the cases preceding it, is not a “pure” treaty
interpretation case. Medellin, like Sanchez-Llamas, involved the failure
of U.S. authorities to notify a foreign national detainee of his ability
to contact his consulate upon arrest. 185 Medellin was one of fifty-one
Mexican nationals named in an ICJ decision, 186 which held that these
nationals “were entitled to review and reconsideration of their [U.S.]
state-court convictions and sentences” because the failure to notify
their consulate was a violation of their rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 187
To determine that the ICJ decision was not directly enforcea188
ble—that is, self-executing —as domestic law in U.S. state courts, the

181. Id. at 566. Justice Kennedy did not join this portion of the opinion. Id.
182. Id. at 633 (plurality opinion).
183. Id.
184. Justice Thomas, in his dissent, which was joined in full by Justice Scalia and in part
by Justice Alito, addressed the Court’s treaty interpretation on two primary points. First,
Justice Thomas found Hamdan’s claims under Article 3 of the Geneva Convention to be
without merit because deference is owed to the executive branch’s interpretation of
“armed conflict not of an international character.” Id. at 718–19 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Second and similarly, Justice Thomas rejected as without merit Hamdan’s claims that the
Geneva Convention even applies to al Qaeda. Id. at 724–25. According to the President,
whose authority as the Commander in Chief “this Court is bound to respect,” this group is
not a “High Contracting Party” to the treaty. Id.
185. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 497–98 (2008).
186. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
187. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 497–99. The state of Texas argued that Medellin had forfeited
his notification right by failing to comply with state rules on challenges to criminal convictions. Id. at 501–04.
188. See supra note 98.
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Court interpreted the provisions of three international agreements. 189
The Court’s decision resulted from reading the treaties’ text and ex190
The Court reamining the context surrounding these agreements.
frained from applying a purposive approach and only glancingly referenced any of the relevant treaties’ purposes. 191
Justice Breyer’s dissent, however, briefly touched on a purposive
approach to treaty interpretation despite arguing that the case posed
questions of domestic law only. Specifically, Justice Breyer argued
that the Court’s reference to treaty text was inappropriate for determining an issue that should only be resolved through reference to
domestic case law. 192 Justice Breyer then suggested the Court’s resort
to treaty interpretation would impact individual rights and have negative consequences in a globalized society. 193 Justice Breyer’s observation suggests a consideration of the wider implications of the Court’s
interpretation; for example, how the interpretation impacts relations
with other nations and the global protection of individual rights.
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Abbott v. Abbott, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that a ne exeat right granted by a Chilean statute conveyed a Hague
Convention custody right to a parent who otherwise held only access

189. Id. at 498–99. The three agreements that the Court interpreted were (1) the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which requires that
Vienna Convention disputes be settled by ICJ, (2) the United Nations Charter, which
creates an obligation for member states to comply with ICJ decisions, and (3) the ICJ Statute, which is an annex of the U.N. Charter and sets out the procedures for the ICJ. Optional Protocol, supra note 155; U.N. Charter art. 92, 59 Stat. 1051, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans
1153 (1945); Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3
Bevans 1153, 1179 (1945) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
190. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 523 (“Nothing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting history, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an international tribunal a higher
status than that enjoyed by ‘many of our most fundamental constitutional protections.’”
(quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006)). This context included (1)
the existence of other procedures to enforce ICJ decisions, id. at 507–08; (2) the executive
branch’s view that the relevant provisions were not self-executing, id. at 513; (3) separation
of powers concerns, id. at 516; and (4) the fact that no member states made ICJ decisions
directly enforceable in their domestic courts, id. at 517.
191. See id. at 511 (describing the ICJ Statute’s “principal purpose” as dispute arbitration between national governments).
192. Id. at 549 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 562 (“Hunting for what the text cannot contain, [the Court] takes a wrong
turn. It threatens to deprive individuals . . . of the workable dispute resolution procedures
that many treaties . . . provide. In a world where commerce, trade, and travel have become
ever more international, that is a step in the wrong direction.”).
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rights. 194 The majority, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy and
joined by five other Justices, 195 based its conclusion on a broad reading of the Convention’s text. The majority noted support for such a
conclusion from the Convention’s objects and purposes, as well as
from extratextual sources of interpretation. 196 In contrast, the dissent, by Justice Stevens, 197 argued that the text of the Convention
clearly and unambiguously indicated that ne exeat rights are access
rights and to find otherwise would contradict the treaty’s purpose. 198
A. The Court Held That Ne Exeat Rights Constituted Custody Rights
Under the Hague Convention
The Hague Convention’s text provided the primary basis for the
majority’s holding that ne exeat rights are custody rights. The Court
began with an analysis of the text, then discussed the extratextual
sources supporting the Court’s reading of the text, and concluded by
assessing the treaty’s objects and purposes. In the reference to the
extratextual sources and purposive analysis, the Court found support
for its initial textually based conclusion that ne exeat rights are custody
rights.
The Court began its analysis by determining that the ne exeat
right conveyed to Mr. Abbott by a Chilean statute gave him the right
to jointly decide his son’s country of residence. 199 The Court noted
the Convention’s recognition of jointly held custody rights. 200 The
Court then concluded that, because the Hague Convention defines
custody rights to include “the right to determine the child’s place of
residence,” Mr. Abbott’s right to determine his son’s country of residence through his statutory ne exeat right constituted a joint custody
right. 201 The Court found dispositive Mr. Abbott’s power to determine his son’s residence, regardless of whether this power is to decide
194. 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990 (2010).
195. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Alito, and Sotomayor joined in
Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Id. at 1987.
196. See infra Part III.A.
197. Justices Breyer and Thomas joined Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion. Abbott, 130
S. Ct. at 1997 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. See infra Part III.B.
199. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1990 (majority opinion). The Court did not rely on the ne exeat
order issued by the Chilean court in assessing whether ne exeat rights are custody rights, as
this judicial order did not contain a parental-consent provision. Id. at 1992. The statutorily granted ne exeat right does contain a parental-consent provision, which the Court found
to be sufficient grounds for its reading of ne exeat rights as custody rights. Id.
200. Id. at 1990 (citing Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(a)).
201. Id. at 1990–91 (citing Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 5(a)).
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a street address or the country where his son lives, because “determine” can be defined as setting limits and boundaries. 202 After recognizing that ne exeat rights may not fit within traditional ideas of
custody rights, the Court emphasized that a “uniform, text-based approach [to treaty interpretation] ensures international consistency.” 203
The Court next turned to extratextual sources of treaty interpretation and found these sources supported the Court’s textually based
conclusions. First, the Court discussed the U.S. Department of State’s
understanding of ne exeat rights as rights of custody. 204 After recognizing the “well-established canon of deference” to the executive
branch’s interpretation, the Court found little reason to reject such
deference in this case, where “the diplomatic consequences” of judicial treaty interpretation might include adverse reactions by a treaty’s
member states and impact U.S. efforts to reclaim children abducted
from the United States. 205 Second, the Court discussed the judicial
decisions of six Hague Convention member states that all held ne exeat
rights to be rights of custody under the Hague Convention. 206 In its
discussion of member-state interpretation, the Court emphasized
again that “‘uniform international interpretation of the Convention’
is part of the Convention’s framework.” 207 Third, the Court highlighted scholarly agreement finding an “emerging international
consensus” for ne exeat rights as custody rights, citing several articles in
support of this consensus. 208 Additionally, the Court emphasized that
the Pérez-Vera Report detailed a definition of custody rights that encompassed a broad, flexible interpretation of all possible rights of
custody and reasoned that ne exeat rights fell under such an approach. 209
Finally, the Court reasoned that the “objects and purposes” of
the Hague Convention supported the Court’s textually based conclu-

202. Id. at 1991.
203. Id. According to the Court, such an approach prevents courts from relying on local definitions or legal traditions, such as traditional ideas of custody. Id.
204. Id. at 1993.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1993–94 (referencing cases in Australia, United Kingdom, Israel, Austria,
South Africa, and Germany). The Court noted a split in the French courts, but minimized, as factually distinct, the more restrictive view held by Canadian courts that ne exeat
rights are access rights and not custody rights. Id. at 1994.
207. Id. at 1993 (quoting ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3) (2006)).
208. Id. at 1994–95.
209. Id. at 1995.
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sion that ne exeat rights constitute custody rights. 210 The Court recognized that the Convention’s purpose is to prevent parents from seeking friendlier forums outside the child’s country of habitual residence. 211 The return of wrongfully removed children is a deterrent
and remedy for such conduct. Therefore, denial of a return remedy
required by other countries—that is, return when the removing parent violated ne exeat rights—would run counter to the Convention’s
purpose. 212
The Court concluded by noting that a parent with a ne exeat right
has a custody right and may seek a judicial order requiring the child’s
return to the country of habitual residence. 213 The Court emphasized, however, that this right to a return remedy is not absolute, as
the Convention recognizes certain exceptions. 214 The Court therefore reversed and remanded the case for further consideration by the
lower court. 215
B. The Dissent Argued That the Convention’s Text and Purpose
Unambiguously Indicate Ne Exeat Rights Are Access Rights, and
Thus Consideration of Extratextual Sources Was Inappropriate
Justice Stevens’s dissent began by distinguishing between Ms.
Abbott’s and Mr. Abbott’s rights: Ms. Abbott has “daily care and control” of the child, while Mr. Abbott has “only visitation rights.” 216 The
ne exeat right, the dissent stated, is a restriction on Ms. Abbott’s custodial rights, but does not by itself constitute a custody right. 217 According to the dissent, holding a restriction on custody rights to be a
custody right in itself contradicts the Hague Convention’s text and
purpose. 218
The dissent then described the context in which the Convention
was drafted and concluded that the Convention’s purpose was to remedy ongoing abuses by noncustodial parents seeking more favorable
forums abroad. 219 In the dissent’s view, the drafters determined that a
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1996.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1997.
214. Id. These exceptions include if the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm, or if the child would be placed in an “intolerable situation.” Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 1997–98.
218. Id. at 1998 (discussing the reasoning used by the majority).
219. Id.
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child should be returned to her country of habitual residence when
she was removed by a noncustodial parent; however, no remedy
should be granted when a custodial parent removes a child from her
country of habitual residence in violation of a non-custodial parent’s
access rights. 220 Return of a child, the dissent emphasized, was intended only for custodial parents and not parents with mere access
rights. 221
The dissent then turned to the Convention’s text to support its
reasoning. It began by noting that custody rights are those rights relating to the care of the child, 222 and found dispositive Mr. Abbott’s
lack of affirmative power to affect his son’s care. 223 The majority’s
“broad reading” of the Convention text, the dissent noted, would destroy the drafters’ distinction between custody rights and access
rights, while also “convert[ing] every noncustodial parent” in Chile to
a custodial parent because of the statutorily granted ne exeat provision. 224
The dissent also rejected the majority’s separation of the right to
determine a child’s “place of residence” from rights relating to the
child’s care. 225 It reasoned that, under the Pérez-Vera Report, determining a child’s place of residence is an example of the rights relating to the child’s care. 226 Accordingly, the dissent argued, determining the place of residence was an example of how to assess what types
of rights a custodial parent has. 227 Even if this clause is divisible from
rights relating to care, the dissent then reasoned, a travel restriction is
not an affirmative right to determine a child’s place of residence. 228
Finally, the dissent argued that the Court’s reliance on extratextual aids in interpretation, such as the executive branch’s interpretation and foreign court decisions, was inappropriate as the Convention’s language is unambiguous. 229 Even if the text had not been
clear, the dissent reasoned, the Court gave too much weight to the
executive branch’s interpretation. 230 The dissent similarly cautioned
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1999–2000.
224. Id. at 2000.
225. Id. at 2001.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2006–07.
230. Id. at 2007. The dissent noted that great weight is given to the executive branch’s
interpretation in the following three instances: (1) in avoidance of international conflict,
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against “substitut[ing]” foreign court interpretations for U.S. court
interpretations when insufficient consensus existed among those foreign court decisions and factual distinctions existed between cases. 231
Thus the dissent found the Court’s reading of the Convention to be
atextual and at odds with the Convention’s purpose. 232
IV. ANALYSIS
The Abbott case provides insight into the post-Rehnquist Court’s
approach to treaty interpretation. Such insight is needed as increasing globalization and treaties impact domestic law. 233 Among the
most interesting aspects of Abbott is the seeming revival of the canons
of good faith and liberal interpretation, at least for interpretation of
purely private-law treaties. 234 Another intriguing aspect of Abbott is the
Court’s rejection of the requirement for textual ambiguity as a trigger
to reference extratextual sources of interpretation. 235 These two
points suggest an evolution in the Court’s treaty-interpretation approach in a global twenty-first century. In addition, the Court also
missed an opportunity to distinguish between treaty and statutory interpretation and thereby reduce lower courts’ misconceptions on
236
treaty interpretation.
A. Abbott v. Abbott Suggests a Revival of Good Faith and Liberal
Interpretation in Purely Private-Law Treaties
Abbott represents the first pure treaty-interpretation decision by
the post-Rehnquist Supreme Court. This status alone justifies an examination of the Court’s approach. The significance of this case is
further enhanced by the Court’s reference to the Hague Convention’s “objects and purposes.” The Abbott Court’s use of this phrase is
the first substantive reference in over seventy years to this signal of

(2) when the executive branch’s interpretation is particularly illuminating, and (3) if the
executive branch’s postratification conduct gives greater understanding of ambiguous
treaty terms. Id. at 2007–08. According to the dissent, however, these circumstances did
not apply to the current case. Id. at 2008. The dissent also cautioned against “abdicat[ing]” to the executive the judicial responsibility to interpret treaty language. Id.
231. Id. at 2008–09.
232. Id. at 2010.
233. Sullivan, supra note 157, at 781 (“As the substantive field covered by treaties grows,
the importance of treaties as instruments of domestic law is enhanced.”).
234. See infra Part IV.A.
235. See infra Part IV.B.
236. See infra Part IV.C.
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good faith and liberal interpretation. 237 Such a reference suggests a
revival of these two canons of interpretation or at least an endorsement of a purposive approach to treaty interpretation. A comparison
with the post-Rehnquist Court’s previous three treaty cases, however,
suggests that any revival of good faith and liberal interpretation likely
is limited to purely private-law treaty cases. 238
1. Reviving Good Faith and Liberal Interpretation Through
Reference to a Treaty’s “Objects and Purposes”
Among the most significant statements in Abbott, at least from a
treaty-interpretation perspective, is the Court’s reference to the Hague Convention’s objects and purposes. Specifically, the Court stated
that “[a]dopting the view that the Convention provides a return remedy for violations of ne exeat rights accords with its objects and purposes.” 239 In the long history of Supreme Court treaty jurisprudence,
such a statement is hardly revolutionary. 240 In fact, such a purposive
approach was common in the Court’s treaty jurisprudence throughout the first half of the twentieth century. 241 The significance of the
Abbott Court’s statement lies instead in the fact that recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence largely ignored good faith and liberal interpretation and rarely referenced a treaty’s objects and purposes. 242
The Abbott decision represents the Supreme Court’s first substantive reference to a treaty’s “objects and purposes” in seventy years. A
review of the Supreme Court decisions from 1940 to 2010 243 identifies

237. See infra Part IV.A.1.
238. See infra Part IV.A.2.
239. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1995 (2010) (emphasis added).
240. See, e.g., Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331–32 (1912) (stating that treaties “are
to be read in the light of the conditions and circumstances existing at the time they were
entered into, with a view to effecting the objects and purposes” of the member states); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 440 (1921) (rejecting a party’s argument as “inconsistent with
the general purpose and object” of the relevant treaty).
241. See supra notes 106–118 and accompanying text.
242. Cf. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, supra note 112, at 215 (noting that the
Court referred to “substantive liberal interpretation canon in only one opinion [United
States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989)] over the last sixty years”).
243. The author conducted multiple searches in Westlaw and Lexis to determine
whether the Supreme Court referenced a treaty’s “objects and purposes” in decisions issued between January 1, 1940, and December 31, 2010. In Lexis, the author used the
search terms “object w/2 purpose” to search within (1) the core term (treaty), (2) the
treaty interpretation subtopic of the international law topic, and (3) the results of a “treaty
interpretation” natural language search. In Westlaw, the author used the terms “object
and purpose” to search within (1) the treaties headnote and subtopic of construction and
operation, (2) the Supreme Court Cases (“SCT”) database, and (3) decisions located by a
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only six decisions that reference a treaty’s “objects and purposes.” 244
Similarly, a targeted review of the last twenty years reveals little effort
by the Court to pursue a purposive approach in treaty interpretation. 245 In fact, during the period of 1982 to 2010, references to a
treaty’s “purpose” are used most often as alternate language for describing the treaty drafters’ intent. 246
The Court referenced a treaty’s objects and purposes in six decisions from 1940 to 2010, and those references were marginal and, for
the most part, contradictory to good faith and liberal interpretation.
Three of these decisions use the language of “objects and purposes”
to bolster an argument for textualism in treaty interpretation. For
example, the Sanchez-Llamas decision quoted the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which states that a treaty should be interpreted according to its object and purpose, to support the Court’s statement that interpretation was based on the terms
of the treaty. 247 The Sanchez-Llamas Court continued by cautioning
against “supplementing” the treaty’s terms and cited the historic precedence of The Amiable Isabella as authority that a domestic court

Di (treaty) search in the SCT database. As of April 25, 2011, six decisions referenced “objects and purposes.”
244. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325(1) (1987)); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 169 (1993); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 372–73
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Rocca, 223 U.S. at 332); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 711 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Rocca,
223 U.S. at 331–32); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 262
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rocca, 223 U.S. at 331–32); Maximov v. United
States, 373 U.S. 49, 52 (1963).
245. David Sloss, in an empirical analysis of U.S. treaty-interpretation approaches, determined that between 1970 and 2006 there were approximately thirty-five U.S. Supreme
Court decisions that substantively addressed treaty analysis. See Sloss, supra note 122, at
514–17. The author of this Note examined the text of those Supreme Court decisions occurring in the last twenty-eight years (1982 to 2010, which included approximately twentyfive cases referenced by Sloss, as well as the 2008 case, Medellin v. Texas) to see whether the
Court included a discussion of the relevant treaties’ purpose and, if yes, how purpose was
described by the Court.
246. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 499 (2008) (referencing the preamble of
the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights in order to describe what the drafters intended for the treaty’s purpose); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 407 (1985) (describing a
provision of the Montreal Agreement as representing the drafters’ intent “to speed settlement and facilitate passenger recovery”); El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 169
(1999) (describing the purpose of the Warsaw Convention as providing uniform rules to
govern air transportation claims, as demonstrated by the preamble of the treaty).
247. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 346 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325(1) (1986)) (“The United States ratified the
[Vienna] Convention [on Consular Relations] with the expectation that it would be interpreted according to its terms.”).
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should not “amend” a treaty through its interpretation. 248 Similarly,
in United States v. Stuart, Justice Scalia cited in his concurrence the
principle of effectuating a treaty’s “objects and purposes,” yet rejected
any inquiry that examined the “intent or expectations of the signatories beyond those expressed in the text” when the text was unambiguous. 249 In Trans World Airlines, Inc. Justice Stevens followed a similar
approach in his dissent, referencing a treaty’s “objects and purposes”
while arguing for interpretation based on the “literal meaning” of the
treaty’s text. 250
The remaining three cases referencing “objects and purposes” also failed to embrace good faith and liberal interpretation. For example, Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. Schlunk focused on the treaty’s purpose rather than its text, but still
failed to apply the “objects and purposes” reference consistently with
good faith and liberal interpretation. 251 Specifically, Justice Brennan
used the Court’s “duty to read the Convention ‘with a view to effecting the objects and purposes of the States thereby contracting’” to
question the majority’s failure to interpret the treaty consistently with
its primary purpose. 252 Yet this reference focused on analyzing the
drafters’ intent rather than as a flexible, forward-looking standard of
interpretation embracing liberal protection of treaty-granted rights.
The fifth and earliest of these cases, Maximov v. United States, flatly rejected the petitioner’s argument to consider the treaty’s objects and
purposes and instead relied simply on the plain meaning of the text
to interpret the treaty. 253 In the last case, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., the Court referenced treaty “objects and purposes” when describing the lower court’s interpretation of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 254 The Court’s own inter-

248. Id. (quoting The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821) (Story, J.)
(“[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause, whether small or great,
important or trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of power, and not an exercise of
judicial functions. It would be to make, and not to construe a treaty.” (alteration in original)).
249. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 372–73.
250. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 262 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens emphasized that “the literal meaning” takes precedence in treaty interpretation. Id.
251. 486 U.S. 694, 711 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
252. Id. (quoting Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331–32 (1912)).
253. 373 U.S. 49, 52 (1963) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that the “purposes and objectives” of the Income Tax Convention between the United States and the United Kingdom require tax exemption for trust beneficiaries because the petitioner’s argument
would result in an outcome “contrary” to the language of the treaty).
254. 509 U.S. 155, 169 (1993).

MaddenFinalBookProof

2012]

3/14/2012 11:48 AM

ABBOTT v. ABBOTT

609

interpretation, however, focused on the drafters’ intent rather than
taking a purposive approach. 255
In contrast to these six cases, the Abbott decision not only referenced the objects and purposes of the Hague Convention but proceeded to take a purposive approach to justify its conclusion that ne
exeat rights are rights of custody. The Court first based its conclusion
on a plain reading of the treaty’s text and the drafters’ intent. 256 The
Court then stated that “[a]dopting the view that the Convention provides a return remedy for violations of ne exeat rights accords with its
objects and purposes.” 257 The Court emphasized that treating ne exeat
rights as custody rights is consistent with the foundational principle of
a child’s best interests and the Convention’s purpose to deter child
abductions by parents seeking “a friendlier forum.” 258 Ultimately, the
Court suggested that the Convention’s objects and purposes are to
prevent “devastating consequences” to an abducted child. 259 The
Court did not reference the Convention itself for this reasoning,
though the Convention preamble clearly recognizes the child’s interests as “paramount” and seeks to prevent abduction. 260 Instead, the
Court focused on the potential harmful consequences to the abducted child in the event the child remains with the abductor. 261
The Court’s purposive approach to the Hague Convention’s interpretation is particularly interesting given the understanding of the
abduction problem at the time of the Convention’s drafting compared with the reality of abductions as it is understood today. The
Hague Convention drafters intended to remedy child abductions involving noncustodial fathers taking a child abroad. 262 However, abduction by a custodial mother is now the more frequent abduction
scenario. 263 Given these changing circumstances, a purposive approach to treaty interpretation appropriately allowed the Court to
consider the evolving family context at the heart of these cases and to
address the complication of ne exeat rights.
In general, the Abbott Court’s use of “objects and purposes” suggests a renewed willingness by the Court to consider aspects of the

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 183.
See supra Part III.A.
Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1995 (2010) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1995–96.
Id. at 1996.
Hague Convention, supra note 3, pmbl.
Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1996.
BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 57, at 3–4.
Id.
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good faith and liberal interpretation canons in some treaty cases.
This usage, however, is seemingly at odds with the treaty cases immediately preceding Abbott, as discussed in the next section.
2. Any Revival of Good Faith and Liberal Interpretation Is Limited
to Purely Private-Law Treaty Cases, and Not Extended to PrivateLaw Treaty Cases Involving U.S. Sovereign Obligations
A comparison between Abbott and the post-Rehnquist Court’s earlier treaty-related cases suggests that any revival of good faith and liberal interpretation is limited to purely private-law treaties. Absent
from the previous three cases of Sanchez-Llamas, Hamdan, and Medellin
is Abbott’s unique reference to “objects and purposes,” as well as a
purposive approach to interpretation. Although Medellin and SanchezLlamas make minor references to treaty purpose, these decisions focused on member-state intent at the time of drafting rather than assessing whether the treaty’s objects and purposes accord with an interpretation more protective of the affected individual’s rights and
the shared understanding of member states. 264 Also absent from the
three previous decisions is a consideration of the potential ramifications of the decision on individual rights, specifically the rights of U.S.
citizens abroad. 265 In contrast, Abbott embraced a purposive interpretation that protected individual rights and sought uniformity with the
international understanding of the treaty.
The distinction in interpretation philosophy is likely premised on
the fact that Abbott is a “purely” private-law treaty case while its three
predecessors involved private-law treaty cases implicating sovereign
obligations. A “purely” private-law treaty case requires that a court interpret a treaty to determine the distribution of private individual
rights. 266 In contrast, private-law treaty cases implicating sovereign obligations address how government actors or domestic laws affect private individual rights. 267
264. See supra Parts II.B.3.a, II.B.3.c.
265. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1993 (discussing the potential impact of its interpretation on
the U.S. Department of State’s ability to reclaim children wrongfully removed from the
United States). But see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 537 & n.4 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (referencing an Oklahoma decision to commute a death sentence in response to
the ICJ Avena decision, in part out of an interest in protecting U.S. citizens abroad); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 398 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing protection of U.S. citizens abroad as one of the Vienna Convention’s purposes and stressing
that improper treaty interpretation can lessen the fair treatment of these same citizens
abroad).
266. See supra note 161.
267. See infra notes 275–279 and accompanying text.
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Distinguishing between purely private-law treaties and private-law
treaties implicating sovereign obligations for the purpose of treaty interpretation is a reality in U.S. courts. 268 A recent empirical study by
David Sloss indicated that courts are more likely to take a treatyinterpretation approach that recognizes and defers to the political
branches when the case involves private parties opposing U.S. government actors. 269 Medellin, Hamdan, and Sanchez-Llamas all fall into
this category. In contrast, Sloss found that purely private-law treaty
cases, like Abbott, are more likely to result in interpretations consistent
with international understandings. 270
Such distinctions likely result from the reality of treaty enforcement. Protection of purely private rights requires reciprocity between
contracting parties. 271 For the Hague Convention cases, the individual right to a return remedy depends on cooperation among the authorities in the country from which and to which a child was wrongfully removed. 272 Therefore, a judicial decision interpreting this
purely private-law treaty is the only avenue for ensuring that disputed
rights are protected. The goal of private-law treaties is to establish uniformity in private law, and a purposive approach aids courts in reach-

268. Cf. Sloss, supra note 122, at 504 (stating that “[a]nalysis of judicial decision making
in treaty cases is problematic because U.S. courts apply two mutually inconsistent models,”
which are “nationalist” and “transnationalist”).
269. Id. at 504–05. Sloss terms such an approach the “nationalist” model, which holds
“that only self-executing treaties have the force of law, that courts should interpret treaties
in accordance with the shared understanding of the U.S. political branches, and that there
is a background presumption that treaties do not create judicially enforceable individual
rights.” Id. at 504.
270. Id. Sloss calls this approach the “transnationalist” model, which holds “that treaties
generally have the force of law in the United States, that courts should interpret a treaty in
accordance with the internationally agreed understanding of its terms, and that individuals are ordinarily entitled to judicial remedies for violations of their treaty-based individual
rights.” Id.
271. Ann Laquer Estin, Families Across Borders: The Hague Children’s Conventions and the
Case for International Family Law in the United States, 62 FLA. L. REV. 47, 52 (2010) (stating
that the efficacy of the Hague Convention “depends on a strong principle of reciprocity
between contracting states”). But see id. at 49 (suggesting that the Hague Convention may
be a “hybrid of public and private international law . . . depend[ing] on . . . cooperation of
government authorities in contracting states”).
272. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION
ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 6 (2010), available at
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/2010ComplianceReport.pdf (describing U.S. Department of
State coordination with the central authorities in other countries and reporting that, of
the 436 children returned to the United States after being “abducted to or wrongfully retained in other countries,” the Hague Convention member states returned 324, or 74 percent, of these children to the United States).
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ing decisions consistent with prevailing international private law. 273
Also relevant is a belief that such individual adjudications have limited policy impacts. 274
In contrast, private-law treaties implicating sovereign obligations
can stretch beyond concern for an individual’s rights and can encompass a country’s stance on international law 275 or a broader policy
conflict. 276 For example, the Court in United States v. Alvarez-Machain
determined that U.S. agents’ abduction of a Mexican national did not
violate a bilateral extradition treaty with Mexico despite submission of
an amicus brief by Mexico stating that Mexico’s interpretation of the
treaty held such an abduction to be a breach of the treaty. 277 The
Court’s decision allowed the U.S. government to take a contrarian
view of international law to benefit U.S. interests. 278 Similarly, the
Medellin Court focused less on the implications of interpretation and
more on the domestic conflict among U.S. laws and separation of
powers. 279
Concerns relating to separation of powers and a belief that executive branch diplomacy is better-suited to resolving conflicts between sovereigns are legitimate. 280 However, resolution of treaty disputes involves not just the adjudication of individual rights in dispute
273. See Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1892 (noting the “rapid expansion of private-law treaties designed to secure international uniformity”). But see Bederman, Revivalist Canons, supra note 101, at 1015 (suggesting that a search for a treaty’s
purpose may lead to a subjective and “standardless” assessment).
274. See Sloss, supra note 122, at 505 (“In litigation between private parties, there is little
risk of creating friction between the judicial and executive branches . . . .”).
275. See, e.g., Bederman, Revivalist Canons, supra note 101, at 1011 (suggesting that in
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) the Supreme Court willingly colluded
with the U.S. government to violate a treaty obligation).
276. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Agora: Medellin: Medellin’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 539–40 (2008) [hereinafter Bederman, Agora] (recognizing the “high-profile federalism conflict” and separation-of-powers concerns present in
Medellin).
277. 504 U.S. 655, 657, 675 n.14 (1992).
278. Bederman, Revivalist Canons, supra note 101, at 1013 (recognizing that the result of
Alvarez-Machain was to allow the United States to maintain “a peculiar view as to a background principle of customary international law”).
279. Bederman, Agora, supra note 276, at 539 (suggesting that Medellin, which may only
be “tangentially about treaty interpretation,” focused on conflicts between state criminal
procedures and federal foreign-relations concerns, as well as separation of powers).
280. See Sloss, supra note 122, at 505 (“[I]n cases where private parties are adverse to
government actors, the private parties are generally invoking a treaty as a constraint on
executive action. In these circumstances, courts might create friction with the executive
branch if they zealously pursued the goal of treaty compliance.”). See also United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 n.16 (1992) (lauding “[t]he advantage of the diplomatic approach to the resolution of difficulties between two sovereign nations, as opposed
to unilateral action by the courts of one nation . . . .”).
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or cross-border diplomacy but also implicates the unique nature of
treaties as shared obligations among nations. 281 A court’s failure to
recognize the shared obligations of member states risks judicial
breaches of treaties, which may impact a broader set of individual
rights and diplomatic relations than those currently before the court.
The canons of good faith and liberal interpretation recognize this
unique nature of treaties and guard against judicial breaches. 282 Such
safeguards are as relevant today as they were a century ago.
A revival of good faith and liberal interpretation would provide a
unifying interpretive philosophy for lower courts and guard against
inadvertent treaty breaches. The Abbott decision suggests the Court’s
willingness to revive a unifying theme of interpretation at least for
purely private-law treaties. Such an approach may reduce lower-court
confusion over the unique role of treaties in domestic law. 283 Medellin,
Hamdan, and Sanchez-Llamas indicate, however, that application of
good faith and liberal interpretation is likely limited to purely privatelaw treaty cases. Unfortunately, this dichotomy in interpretation will
continue the “schizophrenic attitude toward treaty cases” that characterized treaty law in the latter half of the twentieth century, 284 and
likely limit any clarification that the purposive approach might otherwise provide were it more widely accepted.
B. Abbott Allows Reference to Extratextual Sources for Treaty
Interpretation Regardless of Lack of Ambiguity in the Treaty’s Text
Abbott’s implicit rejection of textual ambiguity as a trigger for reference to extratextual sources in treaty interpretation should conclude the debate on the use of these sources initiated nearly thirty
years ago. This rejection is consistent with treaty interpretation
precedent and recognizes the unique nature of treaties. The rejection of ambiguity resulted from the Court’s interpretive approach to
the Hague Convention. In deciding whether ne exeat rights constitute
rights of custody under the Hague Convention, the Court began with
281. Carlos M. Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1082, 1082 (1992) (recognizing that treaties, “[a]s instruments of international
law, . . . establish obligations with which international law requires the parties to comply”).
282. Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1888 (stating that the doctrine of
good faith “served to remind courts of the special international law origins of treaties, of
their fundamental difference with purely domestic legal norms, and of the need to show
sensitivity for the views of our nation’s treaty partners”).
283. Id. at 1887 (suggesting that “confusion in the lower courts” is “the consequence” of
“a rudderless drift in treaty interpretation”).
284. Sloss, supra note 122, at 553 (stating that U.S. courts manifest such an attitude in
domestic litigation).
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an examination of the treaty’s text and from this concluded that ne
exeat rights are rights of custody. 285 The Court then turned to extratextual sources to “support” and “inform” its textually based conclusion that Mr. Abbott has a right of custody by virtue of his statutory ne
exeat right. 286
The Court’s ability to conclude from the Hague Convention’s
text that ne exeat rights are rights of custody implies that the Court
found the treaty’s text to be unambiguous. Yet, despite finding that
the treaty’s text clearly supported its interpretation, the Court referenced extratextual sources and thereby disregarded recent Rehnquist Court cases requiring ambiguity for reference to extratextual
aids in interpretation. 287 Justice Stevens questioned this approach in
his Abbott dissent, noting that “the Court turns to authority we utilize
to aid us in interpreting ambiguous treaty text” even though “the
Convention’s language is plain.” 288
Despite Justice Stevens’s dissent, the Court’s reference to extratextual sources as confirmation of its textual reading is consistent with
precedent and with the unique nature of treaties. Chan v. Korean Air
Lines, Ltd. 289 and United States v. Stuart 290 provide the primary authority 291 for ambiguity as a trigger to reference extratextual sources. Interestingly, little mention is made of ambiguity as a trigger in treatyinterpretation cases preceding and following Chan and Stuart. From
Choctaw 292 to Medellin, 293 the Court recognized that the unique nature

285. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990–93 (2010).
286. Id. at 1993 (observing, among other things, that the Court’s conclusion “is supported and informed by the State Department’s view on the issue” and “ is further informed by the views of other contracting states”).
287. See supra text accompanying notes 139–146.
288. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 2006–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Sumitomo Shoji Am.,
Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982)). Justice Stevens’s use of Sumitomo is odd. Justice Stevens cites Sumitomo as the authority supporting textual ambiguity as a trigger for
use of extratextual sources to aid treaty interpretation. The language cited in Sumitomo,
however, focuses not on ambiguity but instead on whether the treaty language is inconsistent with signatory intent or expectations. See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 180 (“The clear import of treaty language controls ‘unless application of the words of the treaty according to
their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its
signatories.’” (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963)).
289. 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
290. 489 U.S. 353 (1989).
291. In turn, these cases cite as authority Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985), and
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988). Yet neither of these cases
clearly state that ambiguity is the trigger. See supra Part II.B.2.
292. Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943).
293. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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of treaties as a “shared agreement among sovereign powers” 294 warrants use of extratextual sources to ensure that the treaty drafters’ intent is followed and judicial breaches of treaty obligations are
avoided. 295 Reference to such sources is not akin to amending a treaty, as suggested in the Chan opinion. 296 Instead, judicial consideration
of these extratextual sources is well within the “just rules of interpretation” referenced by Justice Story nearly two centuries ago. 297 Reference to extratextual sources, regardless of treaty ambiguity, allows a
court to confirm its interpretation by referencing international practice. This ensures a good-faith interpretation in accordance with the
treaty’s purpose. Such an approach recognizes the unique nature of
treaties and limits judicial breaches of treaty obligations.
C. Abbott v. Abbott Represents a Missed Opportunity by the Supreme
Court to Distinguish Treaty from Statutory Interpretation
Abbott, as one of the few recent Supreme Court decisions dedicated solely to treaty interpretation, gave the Court an opportunity to
definitively remove treaty interpretation from the ideological debate
embroiling statutory interpretation. The Court failed to take this opportunity when it repeated Medellin’s statement that “[t]he interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its
298
text,” yet omitted Medellin’s subsequent reference to the unique na299
Instead, the Court’s incomplete statement suggests
ture of treaties.

294. Id. at 507.
295. See Choctaw, 318 U.S. at 431–32 (recognizing that the unique nature of treaties
supports “look[ing] beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations,
and the practical construction adopted by the parties”); Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507 (stating
that, because a treaty “is an agreement among sovereign powers,” consideration of “negotiation and drafting history” and “postratification understanding of signatory nations” is
appropriate (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
296. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989) (stating that while drafting history “may of course be consulted to elucidate a text that is ambiguous, . . . . where
the text is clear, as it is here, we have no power to insert an amendment” (citation omitted)).
297. See In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821) (“We are to find out
the intention of the parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the subject matter;
and having found that, our duty is to follow it as far as it goes, and to stop where that
stops—whatever may be the imperfections or difficulties which it leaves behind.”).
298. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990 (2010). The dissent also referenced the
Medellin statement. Id. at 1999 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
299. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Because a treaty
ratified by the United States is an agreement among sovereign powers, we have also considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well
as the postratification understanding of signatory nations.”).
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300

an inapt analogy between two disparate canons of interpretation.
Such an analogy provides little guidance to lower courts, which al301
ready appear to meld these two canons of interpretation.
302
Similar omissions have occurred before.
Other Supreme
Court cases that omitted this crucial distinction between treaties and
statutes were subsequently used by lower courts as the basis for relying
303
on statutory construction tools and theories to interpret treaties.
For example, Croll v. Croll cited the 1992 Supreme Court case United
States v. Alvarez-Machain as an introduction to the Second Circuit’s in304
The Croll court then relied
terpretation of the Hague Convention.
on “American lexical sources” and domestic law understandings to interpret what constitutes a custody right under the Hague Conven305
The dissent appropriately questioned such an approach, nottion.
ing that the unique nature of a treaty “requires [looking] beyond
306
parochial definitions to the broader meaning” of that treaty.
Such
failures to look to the broader international context demonstrate why
textualism and other statutory approaches are ill suited to treaty interpretation.
Treaties arise out of an international consensus process that allows few opportunities to correct misguided domestic interpretations
307
Such a result contrasts starkly with interpretaby member states.
tion of domestic statutes, for which the legislative process provides

300. See Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1887 (highlighting the Supreme Court’s “rhetorical ambiguity” and inattention as reasons for lower court confusion
in treaty interpretation).
301. See id. at 1921–22 (recognizing that, in recent cases, lower courts explicitly comment on a presumed similarity between treaty and statutory interpretation and that this
conduct is the result of the Supreme Court’s ambiguity and silence on the distinction between two different canons of interpretation).
302. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992) (stating “[i]n
construing a treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine its
meaning,” and omitting any language distinguishing between the two canons of interpretation).
303. See, e.g., Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 136, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992)) (referencing Alvarez-Machain before
looking to domestic usage to define custody rights as they pertain to the Hague Convention), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
304. Id. at 136.
305. Id. at 138–39.
306. Id. at 145 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
307. Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1927 (footnote omitted) (emphasizing that the consensual nature of treaties can make “renegotiation . . . difficult
and . . . practically impossible for multilateral treaties”).
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308

opportunity to correct unintended judicial interpretations.
Treaty
drafters and the domestic courts that eventually interpret the treaties
bring different legal and linguistic traditions to the tasks of creating
309
The intended
and implementing these international agreements.
meaning of terms used in treaties can be distinct from the meaning
310
Errors in interpretaapplied to those same terms by domestic law.
tion, therefore, may occur when domestic courts apply statutory con311
struction tools, such as textualism, to a treaty. A textualist approach
would ignore, inter alia, member state intent at drafting as well as post312
Instead, as Justice Scalia
ratification understanding of the treaty.
recently noted, “considerable respect” should be given to judicial interpretations by member states as “[o]therwise the whole object of the
treaty, which is to establish a single, agreed-upon regime governing
313
the actions of all the signatories, will be frustrated.”
Despite the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the distinction be314
tween treaty and statutory interpretation, statutory approaches con315
This
tinue to influence lower court interpretations of treaties.
trend is likely to continue if the Court fails to make use of decisions
like Abbott to distinguish treaty interpretation from statutes. This
308. See Bederman, Revivalist Cannons, supra note 101, at 1022–24 (comparing the legislative process of statutes with the consensual process of treaties, and noting that, in this
consensual process “there is no guarantee that a reconciliation could occur”).
309. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 704
(1998) (recognizing that the “adjudicators charged with filling in gaps and resolving ambiguities are themselves products of differing cultural, legal, and political traditions”).
310. See Van Alstine Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1928 (recognizing that the
distinct international legal system from which treaties result means that “treaties must be
interpreted free from the influence of norms of a purely domestic origin”).
311. See Bederman, Revivalist Cannons, supra note 101, at 1022–23 (cautioning against
applying statutory interpretation to treaties because of the concern, among others, that
the two lawmaking processes are distinct).
312. But cf. Van Alstine Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1929 (“More specifically,
through the recent emphasis on shared intent and explicit reliance on drafting history
and subsequent agreed practice, the Court has seemingly accepted that the judicial application of treaties requires the application of independent interpretive principles.”)
313. Antonin G. Scalia, Assoc. J., Supreme Court of the United States, Keynote Address
at the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts (April 2, 2004), in “A DECENT RESPECT TO THE
OPINIONS OF MANKIND…”: SELECTED SPEECHES BY JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
ON FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 109, 110–11 (Christopher J. Borgen ed., 2007).
314. Cf. Bederman, Agora, supra note 276, at 540 (“The proxy bouts of old—in which
treaty interpretation cases were used as a form of ‘shadowboxing’ for the ‘main event’ of
statutory construction jurisprudence—are now at an end. . . . A new eclecticism in the selection of extrinsic sources for treaty interpretation is confirmed.”).
315. Bederman, Revivalist Canons, supra note 101, at 1019–20 (highlighting, in a survey
of Rehnquist-era treaty interpretation cases, that “recent trends in treaty construction have
been subliminally influenced by currents in the statutory interpretation debate”).
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melding of doctrines by lower courts may cause serious consequences
in U.S. international relations as the lower court confusion risks judi316
Abbott thus represents a
cial breaches in international obligations.
missed opportunity in which the Supreme Court could have provided
better guidance to treaty interpretation for the lower courts.
V. CONCLUSION
In Abbott v. Abbott, the Supreme Court of the United States properly held a child’s removal from Chile to Texas to be a violation of
custody rights under the Hague Convention. 317 In so holding, the
Court demonstrated two significant aspects of treaty interpretation
and missed one opportunity. First, the Court applied a purposive approach consistent with good faith and liberal interpretation and thereby signaled a revival of these long dormant canons of interpretation. 318 Second, the Court rejected ambiguity as a trigger for
reference to extratextual aids in interpretation. 319 Third and finally,
the Court missed an opportunity to highlight the unique nature of
treaties and reduce lower court confusion about the similarities between treaty and statutory interpretation. 320

316. Cf. Vázquez, supra note 281, at 1082 (“As instruments of international law, [treaties] establish obligations with which international law requires the parties to comply.”).
317. 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010).
318. See supra Part IV.A.
319. See supra Part IV.B.
320. See supra Part IV.C.

